
Fact-Checking Platform and Instant Local Call Alert System for Saving most Vulnerable, less Protected, and most affected Segment during Disaster using Crowdsourcing-powered Machine Learning application

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Abstract

1 In order to prepare for or respond to a humanitarian disaster, crisis, and emergency,
2 public officials and media organizations often must disseminate large amounts of
3 technical information in a short amount of time. As the result, misinformation can
4 circulate within or outside the affected community, and such misinformation can
5 be particularly deadly during disaster scenarios. Therefore, it becomes a challenge
6 for public safety agencies and organizations to reduce or eliminate the spread of
7 misinformation on social media. The modern era of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
8 based fact-checking models relies on machine learning (ML) models to detect
9 misinformation using sophisticated algorithms. However, most of these ML ap-
10 proaches are limited by the data used to train them and they are over-dependent
11 on being accessed via smartphone app interface which may be insufficient in low-
12 income countries, where more than eighty percent of the population do not have
13 smartphones. Hence in this paper, we propose an integrated fact-checking system
14 that relies on a large network of independent and crowdsourced volunteer “check-
15 ers” who collect, verify and upload any fake messages into an app, which also has
16 functionalities to offer anyone the ability to verify any message they have received.
17 The app can receive messages for verification in form of short message system
18 (SMS), app, and chatbot. In order to address the challenge of high illiteracy level
19 in low-income countries, this platform is also able to support basic featurephones
20 via an SMS-based interface where “verifiers” can send any suspicious message to
21 a dedicated phone number as SMS and receive instant call alert which confirms
22 the veracity or otherwise of the message. The app can also read messages of fea-
23 turephone users based on predefined levels of permission-based access, especially
24 for those who cannot read. The platform relies on the shared intelligence of the
25 “crowd” to train the machine learning models for higher degree of accuracy, while
26 also offering an instant automated call service, which is available as pre-recorded
27 messages in twenty local languages.

28 1 Introduction

29 Natural or technological threats linked to resource loss, environmental degradation, financial damage,
30 health effects, and societal disruptions can result in disaster or undermine societal functionality
31 [4, 11, 3]. Disasters have been occurring more frequently over the past few decades as a result of

32 recent changes in global land use, population growth, and climate change [13]. According to the
33 most recent IPCC study, severe events like drought, floods, forest fires, tsunamis, and tornadoes will
34 become more intense globally over the next decades. According to new research, climate change has
35 also increased the subsequent growth of viral, bacterial, and protozoan epidemics in various parts of
36 the world as well as pandemics like COVID-19 [25, 16], heightening the likelihood of disease in the
37 wake of natural disasters.

38 The four key phases of a catastrophe are prevention, preparation, reaction, and recovery, and effective
39 communication during a crisis can help to lessen the effects of a disaster [3]. During and after
40 disasters, risk communication is vital. This used to take the form of one-way communication to the
41 people from the government [19]. However, it has frequently been observed that government risk
42 communication to the public is insufficient because "People might panic," "People do not need to
43 know," and "Speculation might worsen the disturbance". Experts claim that accurate dissemination
44 of information, including speculative risk and worst-case scenarios, is essential for preventing
45 misunderstandings in the public. Experts claim that accurate dissemination of information, including
46 speculative risk, is essential for preventing misunderstandings in the public and reducing harm in the
47 context of natural disasters [7]. The impact of misinformation disseminated through duplicate news
48 for the purpose of obtaining multiple benefits has dramatically expanded in the age of social media
49 and the internet, throwing noise into this essential channel of communication.

50 Given the increasing use of social media to disseminate and consume news, online social engagement
51 has become one of the major vehicles for circulating such misinformation. Without a doubt, the
52 harm caused by fake news is growing, and it is having a negative impact on social cohesion. For
53 the security and sustainability of society in a contemporary and open internet environment, it is
54 increasingly necessary to recognize fake news, grasp its characteristics, and learn how it spreads. The
55 community-wide responsibility for the stability and sustainability of society in a contemporary and
56 open internet environment rests with identifying fake news and understanding how it propagates. The
57 detection of such fake news requires a comprehensive methodology that considers several predictive
58 characteristics of fake news, including interactions with other users, traits of the disseminator's user
59 profile, and the propagation of the false news event, in addition to the false news texts or content-based
60 information [20].

61 Recently, there has been a wealth of research attempts to model fake news detection using the
62 advancement of ML. One of the most simple and popular methods to detect fake news is to extract
63 linguistic features using n-grams from text and then train multiple predictive ML models in an
64 ensembling methodology. Examples include Decision Trees (DT), K-nearest neighbors (KNN),
65 Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), and Logistic Regression (LR) [2]. On the other hand, theory-
66 driven methods have proven effective. Shu et al. [21] achieve better accuracy by incorporating textual
67 features with auxiliary data, including user social engagements on social media. The authors also
68 addressed how to identify fake information online using social and psychological theories. There are
69 several data mining approaches for extracting predictive features. However, apart from traditional
70 classifier models, one method deep learning-based: incorporating textual features and metadata for
71 training deep neural network models (DNN) such as Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [24].
72 Such models capture complex dependencies in the text which is then mapped using recurrent neural
73 network text embeddings with softmax output activation to obtain the final prediction. Combining
74 both linguistic features with recent DNN models has given the state-of-the-art performance in fake
75 news detection.

76 However, while algorithmic methods can be modestly accurate, the gold standard is human annotation
77 where it can be made available. Hence, in this work, we propose an integrated AI-assisted fact-
78 checking system that relies on a large network of independent and crowdsourced volunteer "checkers",
79 who regularly update all fake messages they receive in daily basis. This rich body of knowledge
80 enriches the "training" capability of the machine learning platform to better help other users of the
81 platform to validate and verify any fake message they receive with higher degree of accuracy. In
82 addition, the platform is able to proactively act when it confirms misinformation via short message
83 system (SMS) by initiating an incoming mobile phone call to the mobile phone number where it has
84 detected the inaccurate message. The automated mobile phone call ls are pre-recorded in twenty
85 local languages to serve the target populations in the low resource African country where it has been
86 deployed.

87 **2 Background: Misinformation**

88 Misinformation is false information that, although it may appear to be true at first, can deceive
89 and have negative repercussions on both the individual and the community [15]. According to
90 research by Motta et al. [14], the public's perception of the COVID19 pandemic were influenced by
91 misinformation provided by right-leaning media, which ultimately contributed to a climate of distrust
92 in media. Additionally, they noted that "even seemingly innocent [misinformation] from trusted
93 media sources may either give people a false sense of security or cause others to disregard official
94 recommendations." In a sense, this directly or indirectly harms the particular society or community.
95 How can misinformation cause harm in the context of humanitarian emergencies? Agraftotis et
96 al. [1] studied the harms stemming from misinformation within organizations, developing a useful
97 taxonomy of potential harms including economic harms, reputational harms, physical or digital harms,
98 psychological harms, and social harms that can extend to other domains.

99 Social media is a crucial component of crisis management. Authorities use it to report breaking news
100 and headlines about developments that are happening in real-time. Public awareness of social media
101 as a crisis communication tool has grown. Due to the pervasiveness of misleading information, social
102 media's triumph has, however, been fleeting. The world's recent experience with misinformation
103 during the COVID19 pandemic is illustrative of the problem. The public's confidence in vaccination
104 has been harmed by anti-vaccination misinformation situations that focus on unproven risks and side
105 effects or the immune system's inability to respond to viruses and bacteria. This has led to a decline
106 in vaccination rates and allowed the community to become exposed to diseases like measles-mumps-
107 rubella, hepatitis B, and H1N1 [17]. Additionally, during the 2016 Zika virus outbreak, myths about
108 the virus' severity (Zika virus symptoms are similar to seasonal flu), cause, immunity, and prevention
109 complicated to combat the serious infectious disease, putting people's health at risk [8].

110 Gupta et al. [10] looked into how misinformation-filled messages spread after natural disasters like
111 hurricane Sandy. They concluded that the majority of these messages were shared messages and
112 that there were very few original messages. Rajdev and Lee [18] looked at the activities of harmful
113 users who posted disinformation, finding that tweets from malicious users received fewer likes than
114 non-malicious accounts. Similar to this, false information about the 2006 Louisiana floods spread
115 through Facebook messages and posts overwhelmed FEMA and the American Red Cross in March
116 2016. Recent studies of Twitter users have addressed specific kinds of false information and its
117 negative effects, such as the use of household cleaners as COVID-19 viral treatments [5]. Such
118 factors not only pollute the information media but also has a serious impact on the people and their
119 surroundings.

120 The dangers of misinformation are further compounded in less developed countries, where official
121 channels of communication and digital literacy are not as robust. Hence in this paper, we tackle the
122 impact of misinformation in a community with a less protected but deeply affected segment during
123 disaster and crisis in Nigeria.

124 **3 Fact Checking System using Crowdsourcing and Instant Call Alert**

125 Here, we explain the overall architecture of our model in detail along with a brief explanation of each
126 component used in the model. The proposed framework not only predicts misinformation but also
127 designs a full system from (1) data collection to (2) delivering the service and (3) user engagement
128 and intervention, suitably applicable for crisis and disaster management. Our architecture composes
129 three components: namely (1) Multi-modal data extraction, (2) ML modeling for fake news detection,
130 and (3) an Engagement/Intervention of the model with the user as shown in Fig. 1.

131 **3.1 Multi-modal data extraction**

132 The first component of the proposed framework deals with the data collection associated with several
133 modes such as text, audio-video, and images. Here we intend to collect data from all possible sources
134 into standard plain text. The sources of these texts are taken to be from SMS, WhatsApp message,
135 social media posts, comments, and hashtags. In addition to this, the text in the images is extracted
136 using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) [23]. OCR is a technique that identifies printed or
137 handwritten text characters inside digital images of real-world documents, including scanned paper
138 documents. OCR's fundamental procedure entails reading text from a document and turning the




Figure 1: Framework of proposed fact-checking model with instant call alert.

139 characters into a form of code that may be utilized to process data. At last, we also process the
 140 message in audio and video using crowdsourcing where they capture the meaning and represent it in
 141 the text format, through app-user notation.

142 3.2 ML-based modeling

143 This subsection of the system consists of fact-checking and detection of misinformation. Various
 144 models have achieved state-of-the-art performance in fake news detection. One of the models
 145 described by Hochreiter and Schmidhuber [12] transforms the Twitter data into variable length
 146 representation using RNNs and LSTMs [9] with 1 layer of hidden units for rumor detection. These
 147 experiments show that RNN architectures have advantages over conventional ML models. Another
 148 variant of RNN apart from LSTM is GRU, which is simpler and more computationally efficient [6].
 149 For the same Twitter data, it has been observed that the accuracy and F-measure performance of their
 150 GRU models was strong, though the precision and recall metrics for their classical support vector
 151 machine (SVM) models were marginally stronger, suggesting that much simpler models without deep
 152 learning will do in this task setting.

153 As of now there are several fake news detection model that uses sophisticated neural network models
 154 integrated with linguistic features extraction techniques. Beyond News Contents: The Role of Social
 155 Context for Fake News Detection [22] is a model based on the interaction of people that uses summary
 156 data such as the quantity of tweets they post. User credibility is determined by the size of their
 157 individual cluster, and the bigger the cluster, the less credible the user is. A hybrid model introduced
 158 in [20] uses increasingly sensitive data related to the user's profile. This effort makes it possible to
 159 determine a user's reputation, which is defined through the formulation of a score. It also offers the
 160 user's social participation as a substitute for obtaining this score. In this instance, a user's score is
 161 determined by their social network activities, such as the quantity of likes. A similar architecture,
 162 DistrustRank, uses the similarities between questionable websites and the presence of contentious
 163 issues to discredit websites that disseminate fake news. The level of the website's reputation is
 164 utilized to identify fake news, not the user, and the information used found from the url for the news
 165 link using PageRank [26]. However, these models are mostly neural network based architecture that
 166 are complex and black-box in nature (low interpretability). Since, our approach extends the traditional
 167 ML model using crowdsourcing work as transfer learning, the model has to be computationally
 168 efficient for quicker inference. Hence, we experimented the using various traditional models such as
 169 KNeighbors, LightGBM, XGBoost, and Random Forest. It has been observed that performance of
 170 these models are on par with bigger models with limited computational complexity.

171 In addition to this, we design proactive and predictive measure that focuses on the use of a volunteer
 172 crowd of professionals and non-professionals across the country who share as many as over 1,000
 173 fake messages per day. They share the fake messages and validate the model for fact-checking which
 174 in turn improves accuracy over time by augmenting the training data available.

175 **3.3 Engagement/intervention**

176 After running the fact-checking ML models, we engage users into an intervention loop. The model
177 here has two sub-parts: one part dealing with the most important aspect of the illiterate community
178 known as rural smartphone users, and another for urban or semi-urban smartphone users. The
179 system can receive content for verification purposes as an SMS, USSD, App, or chatbot on Telegram,
180 WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger. For urban and semi-urban users, the concept is pretty straight-
181 forward, where they can directly copy and paste the text, image, audio, or video to NaLie App for
182 instant verification. Another approach is to copy and paste the text, image, audio or video to the
183 Chatbot for instant verification. The main context lies with deployment in vulnerable communities,
184 such as users from rural areas where illiteracy and lack of awareness are major challenges that the
185 deployed app aims to address. People in underprivileged areas need constant assistance against such
186 misinformation during crises and disasters. Hence, we tackled this situation differently. We used the
187 individual's permission with the utmost respect for privacy so that the app automatically picks up all
188 the suspicious SMS messages as rated by the predictive system for instant verification.

189 Unlike app-based verification, SMSs are read and the user assumed to be illiterate, and the platform
190 initiates a verification telephone call in any of the 20 local languages to determine whether the person
191 who sent the message is a valid or invalid source, or if the user is unsure. We have prerecorded
192 messages for each respective case in 20 different local languages, using crowdsourcing.

193 **4 Outcomes**

194 We have implemented our proposed framework at the root level so that it reaches a particular
195 community of underprivileged people during COVID-19, internal displacement, and flood crises. In
196 particular, we have used it in Nigeria for providing potentially lifesaving interventions among above
197 mentioned vulnerable communities. The proposed platform has over 2,000 volunteers who submit an
198 average of 1,000 false messages per week, most of which are similar and are related to the various
199 misinformation issues in the country.

200 The solution and its unique approach, especially for the users of featurephones were recognized by
201 the National Emergency Management Agency as one of the indigenous and homegrown solutions that
202 can complement the government's effort during the humanitarian intervention. The non-profit that is
203 providing this public service is currently engaging mobile telephone service providers to make the
204 services free on their network as free call services (zero-rated calls) to render the service sustainable.

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